block in each dataset was assigned to the congressional district it belonged to in each general election between 1998 and 2006.
Texas's territory is divided into 8,634 2004-VTDs and 675,062 2000-census blocks. Since even unpopulated areas were assigned a census block in 2000, 207 of these 8,634 VTDs have zero population and hence zero election returns. Of the remaining VTDs, some had to be discarded due to the phenomenon of "multiple congressional districting" which occurs when a VTD reports election returns for more than one congressional district in a given election. We exclude from the analysis all VTDs for which multiple redistricting occurs once or more in the period under analysis. After imposing these restrictions, the sample size is 8,040 VTDs. California's territory is divided into 533,163 2000-census blocks, of which 344,356 have positive population. Since 46,843 of these blocks have population of less than 10, many blocks have no votes cast in some or all of the years under analysis. We restrict our sample to those blocks with a positive number of votes cast in all congressional elections between 1998 and 2006. After imposing this restriction, the sample size is 284,040 blocks.
As mentioned in the paper, the SBOT design must condition on crucial covariates related to voters' previous history in their old districts. For this reason, when estimating the personal vote using this design, we restrict our analysis to movements between incumbents of the same race, ethnicity, and gender. Our substantive results are unchanged if we don't restrict the analysis in this way. Our analysis also excludes incumbents whose original districts are modified so radically that the share of old voters in the newly redrawn district is almost zero.
Additional details about QQ-plots in Figure 1 and placebo test
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) below reproduce Figures 1(a) and 1(b) in the paper. As mentioned in the paper, these figures the empirical Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plots of the baseline vote share received by the incumbent U.S. House member in the election before redistricting, comparing units that were to be redistricted to a different incumbent in the following election (would-be treatments) to units that were to remain with the same incumbent after redistricting (would-be controls). The unit of analysis As discussed in the paper, Figure 1 shows that, in both states, units with a lower incumbent vote share in the election before redistricting are more likely to be moved to a different incumbent when redistricting is implemented. Figure 2 presented here shows that this bias remains even after both types of voters are matched on their partisan attachments as measured by presidential vote shares. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the same QQ plots as figures 1(a) and 1(b), respectively, but this time the QQ plots are produced after would-be treatments and would-be controls are matched on their Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote. Even after matching, would-be treatments still vote for their old incumbent at a lower rate. If at least part of this tendency of new voters to vote for their incumbent at a lower rate persists in the future, comparing old voters and new voters will be biased towards finding a positive personal vote even when there is none.
This additional QQ-plots matching on presidential vote suggest that presidential vote alone will not be enough to pass the placebo test discussed in the paper. Table 2 in the paper. Row (2) shows that presidential vote alone is not sufficient to satisfy this placebo test. (We present results here for using the 2000 presidential vote as the estimate of the normal vote, but we have also conducted placebo tests using means and medians of a number of past presidential elections.) We obtain excellent balance on Presidential vote in 2000 when we match only on this variable (results not shown in the table, but shown graphically below). However, as shown in Row (2) of Table 1 , unlike the case for the rich conditioning set used in the estimate of the first row, there is a significant treatment effect on House vote in 2002 when we compare placebo treatments to placebo controls after matching on this variable only. Conditioning on party registration instead of or in addition to the presidential vote is also insufficient to pass the placebo test.
The covariates we used to perform the matching for our placebo test are reported in Table 1 in the paper. As discussed in the paper, our dataset allows us to draw on a rich set of covariates based on electoral returns, registration files, and census data. We use past presidential vote returns, returns from statewide offices, registration figures, past turnout numbers, and the past vote for the Democratic Party's House candidate. Moreover, since both the treated and control units in this placebo test are in the same congressional district before redistricting occurs (as they are in the FBTT design), we match by construction on the party of the incumbent, the historical quality of challengers, and other aspects of past races at the local, statewide and national level as experienced by the units we are matching.
The results in Table 1 Table 1 above.
The confidence intervals reported in Table 1 
Texas and California redistricting plans in the 2000s
Texas implemented six different congressional district plans between 1990 and 2006.
5 After the reapportionment that followed the 1990 census, the districts enabled by the old C001 plan were redrawn. The 1992 elections were held under the new districts enacted by plan C657, which remained in effect until the 1996 primaries. In August 1996, 13 of Texas's 30 congressional districts were redrawn.
The new plan, C746, was used in the 1996 general election and it remained in effect during the 1998 and 2000 elections. Tables A1, A2 and A3 present the number of VTDs and census blocks in our sample that were affected by these redistricting plans in both states -both overall and separately by pre-redistricting incumbent party.
